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I. INTRODUCTION
ODAY, microfinance institutions (MFIs) are providing financial
services to millions of the world's most impoverished citizens, who
were once deemed "unbankable" by traditional banks due to their
lack of credit history and collateral.1 Although MFIs experienced limited
success upon their creation, it is currently estimated that between 1,000
B. Seth McNew is an associate at Winstead PC in Dallas, Texas.
1. See Microfinance Alliance, http://www.microfinancealliance.org/home, (last visited
Nov. 16, 2008) (discussing Grameen Bank, an MFI, which by itself reaches nearly 6
million borrowers).
288 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
and 2,500 MFIs provide access to financial services for around sixty-eight
million clients in over 100 different countries. 2 vhile great strides have
been made in reaching those people who were traditionally ignored by
the banking industry, some estimate that MFIs are still reaching fewer
than 5 percent of the potential microfinance clients, due, at least in part,
to a lack of a formal regulatory framework.3
The crux of the problem is this-more regulation of MFIs is needed,
but too much regulation may make it impossible for MFIs, which by their
nature require flexibility, to survive. 4 A more uniquely tailored regula-
tory framework is necessary in order to allow MFIs to offer more ser-
vices, reach more clients, and, ultimately, become more self-sufficient.
While it is clear that some regulation is necessary, how much regulation
and what form it will take remains unclear. Moreover, regulation can
easily become overbearing, and the cost of compliance may become so
high as to defeat the ultimate goal of MFIs, namely, giving the world's
poorest citizens access to financial services. As noted by USAID, the
goal of any reform of the regulatory framework of MFIs "should be to
create an environment that supports the expansion of financial services to
the poor, thereby increasing access."' 5 In effect, a tension exists between
increasing regulation, thus allowing more services to be offered and en-
suring that the regulation enacted does not become so overbearing as to
force MFIs out of existence.
This paper suggests a balanced approach to that regulation in order to
minimize the overall cost and maximize flexibility in the regulatory
framework, thus achieving the ultimate goal of sound financial services
providers and increased access to clients. In order to accomplish these
goals, this paper proposes that prudential regulation should be used as
minimally as possible due to its high cost, both to the MFIs that are regu-
lated and to the nations implementing the regulatory framework. Be-
cause it is seemingly impossible to reach the objectives of "1) protecting
[a] country's financial system by preventing the failure of one institution
from leading to the failure of others, and 2) protecting small depositors
who are not well positioned to monitor the institution's financial sound-
2. Rajdep Sengupta & Craig P. Aubuchon, The Microfinance Revolution: An Over-
view, Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Rev., Jan. Feb. 2008, at 9, 10, available at http://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/01/Sengupta.pdf [hereinafter The
Microfinance Revolution].
3. See CGAP, Regulation & Supervision of Microfinance Institutions: Stabilizing a
New Financial Market, CGAP Focus No. 4, (1996). available at http://collab2.cgap.
org/gm/document-1.9.2550/FocusNote_04.pdf [hereinafter Focus No. 4].
4. Globalenvision.org, The History of Microfinance, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.global
envision.org/library/4/1051/ [hereinafter Globalenvision] (noting that if regulations
place interest rate ceilings too low, MFIs may not be able to cover the cost of
servicing their loans, and will thus be forced out of existence).
5. USAID.gov, Model Scope of Work: Legal & Regulatory Reform for Access to Fi-
nance Policy & Programming Toolkit, Dec. 2005, at 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-
docs[PNADF663.pdf [hereinafter USAID Programming Tool, Dec.].
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ness themselves," some prudential regulation is warranted. 6 This paper
notes, however, a number of issues that may be dealt with through non-
prudential regulation, thus retaining a more flexible system for MFIs and
decreasing the overall cost of regulation. Only with this type of regula-
tion will microfinance institutions become self sufficient, thus reaching
their ultimate potential in eliminating world poverty by providing the
maximum number of financial services to the maximum number of
clients.
This paper will first address, in Part II, the background of the
microfinance industry, which will include a general explanation of
microfinance and the services that are encompassed within that term.
Many people are familiar with the term microlending, but some may fail
to recognize that other microfinance services, such as microsavings and
microinsurance, also have great potential in reducing worldwide poverty.
This will be followed by a short history of microfinance, from its earliest
beginnings to the modern-day successes of MFIs, such as Muhammad
Yunus's Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and the techniques that these en-
tities used to achieve their success.
Part III of this paper will then turn to the regulation and supervision of
microfinance institutions. Specifically, this section will discuss why regu-
lation and supervision of MFIs is currently necessary and when a particu-
lar geographic region may be ready to implement a more formalized
regulatory and supervisory framework. It is important to note that at-
tempting to increase regulation, or sometimes even bringing to light cur-
rent practices of MFIs, may cause these entities to come under greater
scrutiny. While greater scrutiny may be necessary, it is important to en-
sure that scrutiny from legislatures and the general public does not have
any unintended detrimental effect on existing MFIs. As some practition-
ers have noted, even though certain activities of microfinance institutions
are warranted (such as charging higher interest rates), "it may still prove
difficult to defend them when they are subject to broad (and uninformed)
public discussion."'7 Part IV will then delve deeper into the different
types of regulations that may be implemented within a microfinance reg-
ulatory framework.
When developing regulations for MFIs, regulators must choose be-
tween prudential regulation and non-prudential regulation. Prudential
regulation is that which "governs the financial soundness of licensed in-
termediaries' businesses, in order to prevent financial-system instability
and losses to small, unsophisticated depositors."'8 In general, prudential
regulation is more expensive than non-prudential regulation, which re-
6. Robert Peck Christen, Timothy R. Lyman, & Richard Rosenberg, Microfinance
Consensus Guidelines: Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of
Microfinance, (CGAP), July 2003, at 15-16, available at http://www.microfinance
gateway.com/files/13473-13473.pdf [hereinafter Consensus Guidelines] (noting the
two goals of prudential regulation).
7. Id. at 11.
8. Id. at 6.
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quires no third-party oversight and may not be necessary to resolve many
of the issues currently facing MFIs. 9 Part IV will discuss each of these
types of regulation in depth, including what issues may be addressed by
each and when each form may be appropriate.
Finally, Part V of the paper will make a modest proposal for proper
regulation of MFIs. This proposal will suggest a system that balances the
need for more stringent regulation with the flexibility needed to make
MFIs functional as well as other countervailing interests. The system
must balance the need for prudential regulation with the high costs of
such a system. Some prudential regulation is needed in order to allow
MFIs to take deposits and thus become more self-sufficient; however, this
regulation must not become so overbearing or costly so as to make com-
pliance next to impossible. Ultimately, the regulatory framework must
balance the risks facing individual depositors and the financial system as a
whole with the goal of providing greater access to financial services to
those individuals who have been traditionally "unbanked." While regula-
tion is certainly important, and the creation of sound MFIs is one of the
goals of increased regulation, the ultimate goal is to decrease poverty
throughout the world by increasing the poor's access to financial services.
Stated another way, regulators should not try to completely eliminate the
risks facing microdepositors and the growing microfinance industry; it
would simply be too expensive and lead to the demise of all but the larg-
est MFIs. Instead, regulators should attempt to maximize access to finan-
cial services while ensuring that the entities providing those services are
financially sound. In order to fully understand this proposal, some gen-
eral background information is necessary.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Before continuing, it is important to understand exactly what
microfinance is and the history of the organizations that have provided
these services over time.
A. WHAT IS MICROFINANCE
Microfinance is defined by the Microfinance Alliance as "financial ser-
vices targeting and catering to clients who are excluded from the tradi-
tional financial system on account of their lower economic status."'10 This
term can encompass a variety of services including microcredit, microsav-
ings, and microinsurance. These services are provided by microfinance
institutions that typically specialize in offering financial services to low-
income populations. 1 While all MFIs are dedicated to providing these
services, the structure of these organizations is anything but uniform. The
9. See id. at 7.
10. Microfinance Alliance, What is Microfinance, hhtp://www.microfinancealliance.
org/what (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) [hereinafter MicrofinanceAlliance].
11. Microfinance Gateway, What is Microfinance? http://www.microfinancegateway.
com/section/faq (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
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typical MFI is some form of a financial "Non-Governmental Organiza-
tion" (NGO), but other organizations including credit unions, coopera-
tives, private commercial banks, and even non-bank financial institutions
do exist. 12 Regardless of the form that these institutions take, their goal
is the same: to reach the "poor sectors of the economy" and provide fi-
nancial services to those individuals on a "sustainable basis."'13 In the
future, the fulfillment of that goal may have much less to do with how
these entities are organized and much more to do with the regulatory
structure in which they operate.
Perhaps the most well-known microfinance service is "microcredit," or
"the extension of small loans to micro-entrepreneurs who lack collateral
and do not qualify for traditional bank loans."'1 4 The term microcredit
has, over the years, included an astonishing number of credit arrange-
ments including money lender credit, loans from friends and relatives, or
even loan shark-type credit, recognized by its extremely high-if not usu-
rious-interest rates.1 5 That being said, within the scope of this paper,
microcredit will mean a more formalized form of microlending. Specifi-
cally, it will be a service provided by NGO or non-NGO MFIs, generally
offered on a non-collateralized basis, and targeted at the poor so that
they may help themselves overcome poverty. This is a crucial portion of
the microfinance industry in that it provides the very poor with access to
capital and thereby gives them the ability to jump-start an income-gener-
ating activity, such as a small business. 16 Although microcredit is the
most recognized microfinance service, microsavings may prove to be just
as important to the sustainability of MFIs without donor and governmen-
tal help.
Microsavings may be defined as a service offering small deposit ac-
counts "to lower income families or individuals as an incentive to store
funds for future use."' 17 In general, these very small savings accounts
work much like any other savings account except that minimum balance
requirements are either very low or nonexistent and the amount of
money stored in these accounts is much smaller. 18 Despite the small
amount stored in each individual account, many believe that mobilizing
these small savings funds may be the key to creating self-sufficient, sus-
tainable MFIs that can function without the help of NGOs or foreign
donors. 19 Microsavings has taken a backseat to microcredit in the past,
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Microfinance Alliance, supra note 10.
15. Grarneen Bank, Banking for the Poor What is Microcredit?, Aug. 2008, http://
www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=28&Item
id=108.
16. Microfinance Alliance, supra note 10.
17. Investopedia.com, Microsavings, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/microsav-
ings.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
18. Id.
19. See CGAP, Savings Mobilization Strategies: Lessons from Four Experiences,
CGAP Focus No. 13, Aug. 1998, at 1, available at http://www.cgap.org/docs/Focus
Note 13.pdf [hereinafter Focus No. 13].
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and many MFIs do not currently offer microsavings services. Experts,
however, believe that if given the opportunity, microfinance clients would
utilize these services.20 If this is the case, then mobilizing these savings
could "contribute to self-sustainability by providing the MFI with cheaper
funds than those from the interbank market. 21 Not only would poor
savers be given somewhere to store their money for future use, but also
the poor borrowers would benefit from expanded lending operations due
to the stable funding source of the deposits. 22 Microcredit and microsav-
ings are the two services most pertinent to the discussion of regulation
and supervision presented in this paper, but it is important to note that
these services are by no means exhaustive of those offered by MFIs. Be-
cause they are beyond the scope of this paper, microinsurance and more
obscure microfinance services will not be discussed.
B. THE HISTORY OF MICROFINANCE
Although the techniques, organizations, and services offered to
microfinance customers are ever-changing, and modern MFIs and the ac-
tual products they offer bear little resemblance to the entities and ser-
vices utilized in the past, the basic premise of microfinance is not a new
concept.2 3 In fact, informal savings and credit groups have been in exis-
tence throughout the world for centuries, including the "'susus' of Ghana,
'chit funds' in India, [and] 'tandas' in Mexico," among many others.24 Al-
though it was not until the 1970s when the global microfinance movement
really took hold-beginning with lending experiments in the impover-
ished villages of Latin America and Asia- formalized microlending and
microsavings institutions have been around for hundreds of years.25
One of the earliest formal microlending organizations, the Irish Loan
Fund, began in Ireland in the early 1700s and was actually started by
Jonathan Swift, the well-known author.26 These donor-financed institu-
tions initially began as charities attempting to alleviate the poverty-
stricken citizens of rural Ireland.2 7 Although they initially offered inter-
est-free loans, the enactment of a new law in 1823 allowed the funds to
accept interest-bearing deposits and to charge interest on loans.28 It was
this new law, allowing the acceptance of deposits, and the regulation and
supervision that accompanied the law, which allowed the Irish Loan Fund
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 1.
23. Globalenvision.org, The History of Microfinance, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.global
envision.org/library/4/1051/.
24. Id.
25. Microfinance Alliance, supra note 10; See also Globalenvision, supra note 4.
26. Globalenvision, supra note 4.
27. Hans Dieter Seibel, Does History Matter? The Old and the New World of
Microfinance in Europe and Asia 2 (Oct. 7, 2005) (paper presented at: From Mon-
eylenders to Microfinance: An interdisciplinary workshop), available at http://
www.microfinancegateway.org/files/29667_file Does-History-Matter.pdf [herein-
after Does History Matter?].
28. Id.
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to eventually grow into over 300 funds throughout Ireland. 29 In fact, at
the pinnacle of the Irish Loan Fund, the organization was lending to 20
percent of all Irish households on a yearly basis-no small feat for one of
the first attempts at formalized microfinance. 30 This is perhaps one of the
earliest examples of the successes of a formalized regulatory and supervi-
sory framework. By allowing the mobilization of deposits through ena-
bling legislation, and coupling that with appropriate regulation, these
Irish Loan Funds achieved self reliance and sustainability that is not often
found, even in today's microfinance institutions. 31
Over time, various forms of MFIs continued to emerge to serve the
rural poor throughout Europe and Latin America. 32 Almost all of these
institutions had similar objectives, namely, "increased commercialization
of the rural sector, by mobilizing 'idle' savings and increasing investment
through credit, and reducing oppressive feudal relations that were en-
forced through indebtedness. ' 33 Interestingly enough, some of these in-
stitutions opted to utilize a supply-side approach to the problem and
offered subsidized loans and below-market interest rates.34 Unlike the
Irish Loan Fund, which offered loans at higher rates, but also offered
higher rates on deposits, these government subsidized schemes almost in-
evitably failed.35 Perhaps history was teaching another lesson-that sub-
stantial regulation and supervision for independently functioning MFIs is
ultimately more successful than government intervention and donor de-
pendence. But, it was not until the 1970s that the modern microfinance
movement began.36
Much like many of the microfinance institutions before them, Muham-
mad Yunus and the Grameen Bank offered the impoverished of Ban-
gladesh an opportunity to free themselves from poverty by offering small
loans to those traditionally passed over by commercial banks. 37 The be-
ginnings of this enterprise were modest, loaning only twenty-seven dol-
lars to forty-two stool makers; but Grameen Bank now includes over "5.5
million members with greater than $5.2 billion in dispersed loans."'38 De-
spite the fact that traditional lenders believed the poor to be un-
creditworthy and lacking in skills or the financial wherewithal to allocate
borrowed funds towards their most efficient use, Grameen Bank has
proved them wrong.39 In fact, Grameen Bank currently reports a repay-
ment rate of 98 percent on its loans.40 It has shown that "poor house-
29. Id.; Globalenvision, supra note 4.
30. Globalenvision, supra note 4.
31. See Does History Matter? supra note 27, at 2.
32. Globalenvision, supra note 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; Does History Matter?, supra note 27, at 2.
36. Microfinance Alliance, supra note 10.
37. The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 2, at 9.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Microfinance Alliance, supra note 10.
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holds can benefit from greater access to credit and that the provision of
credit can be an effective tool for poverty alleviation... [as well as prov-
ing].. .that institutions do not necessarily suffer heavy losses from lending
to the poor. ' 41 Much of the success of Grameen Bank may be attributed
to its unique "group lending" idea. Essentially, potential borrowers or-
ganize themselves into groups, and if anyone in the group defaults on
their loan, then the rest of the group is unable to receive future credit.42
This essentially takes the credit risk off the bank and places it squarely
upon those wishing to receive loans. Because almost every borrower has
an interest in having access to future credit, they organize themselves
with individuals believed to be creditworthy and take a hands-on ap-
proach to ensuring that all borrowers within their group meet the pay-
ment schedule. 43 History does appear to show that by utilizing this
unique group lending approach in conjunction with a formalized regula-
tory and supervisory framework (which would, allow for the enactment of
deposit taking legislation) the creation of self sufficient, sustainable, MFIs
is completely within the realm of possibility. But, for the majority of
MFIs today, one of the main ingredients that makes all of this possible is
missing-the formalized regulatory structure.
III. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS
Before examining the different types of regulation that may be used to
create a uniquely tailored regulatory framework for microfinance institu-
tions, one must understand why regulation and supervision are necessary
and when it is appropriate to adopt a new regulatory framework.
A. WHY ARE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE
INSTITUTIONS NECESSARY?
To be sure, microfinance has seen some success stories, and, certainly,
evidence from a variety of programs from around the globe supports the
proposition that microfinance is a benefit to the poor.44 Not only has
microfinance proven to be an aid to the monetary problems of the indi-
viduals it serves, but also "access to financial services... translates into
broader social benefits, including improved health... ; increased educa-
tional participation; and greater gender equality. '45 Despite its successes,
there are a number of reasons why a change to the current microfinance
system is in order, and a number of reasons why microfinance should be
41. The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 2, at 11.
42. The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 2, at 12.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Ashley Hubka & Rida Zaidi, Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance:
Improving the Investment Climate for Growth and Poverty Reduction 4 (2005) (pa-
per prepared for the World Development Report), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/HubkaZaidiImpact-of-Government_
Regulation.pdf [hereinafter Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance].
45. Id. at 4-5.
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regulated. These reasons include benefits "such as improved self-sus-
tainability of microfinance institutions, protection of savings, safeguard-
ing the stability of financial systems, mitigation of risk due to currency
mismatches, prevention of money laundering and of funding terrorism.
46
Although some question the legitimacy of every regulation proponent's
claims, others suggest that the potential benefits of increased regulation
are only limited by the number of individuals you survey.
In a recent CGAP occasional paper, it seemed that every proponent of
regulation had its own reasoning. Many MFIs believe, as does the author,
that regulation is essential for MFIs looking to fund themselves. Others
believe that "regulation will promote their business and improve their
operations," and still others suggest that regulation is key in speeding the
emergence of sustainable MFIs. 47 Even local authorities in regions where
MFIs are operating have their own justifications for regulation; they "are
sometimes troubled by the weakness of many MFIs, and unimpressed
with the coordination and supervision being exercised by the donors who
fund them. They want someone to step in and clean up a situation that
they think is hurting the development of microfinance in their country. 48
If truth be told, each of these justifications for a formalized regulatory
framework has some merit, but more importantly, these justifications are
interrelated, and the logical relationship between them is complex and
almost circular. 49 The very same regulation that may serve to allow de-
posit taking will ultimately lead to a more self-sufficient MFI, and thus
the increased outreach of these institutions to the individuals demanding
their services. But, to put it plainly, the main problem facing
microfinance is that, currently, it is not a sustainable, self-sufficient enter-
prise, and it is not reaching enough people. 50 Both of these problems
stem, at least to some extent, from the fact that formal regulation and
supervision is lacking.
In 2001, it is estimated that "more than 1,000 microfinance programs
around the world had reached approximately 20 million borrowers." 51
Today, these numbers have grown and it is estimated that between 1,000
and 2,500 MFIs are currently serving around 67.6 million clients.52 Of
those 67 million individuals, "more than half of them come from the bot-
46. Panel Discussion Regulation of Microfinance, UNCDF, 2007, http://www.un.org/
esa/ffd/events/microfinance/report.pdf.
47. Robert Christen & Richard Rosenberg, The Rush to Regulate: Legal Frameworks
for Microfinance, Occasional Paper No.4 (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor,
Washington D.C.) Apr. 2000, at 1, available at http://www.uncdf.org/mfdl/readings/
CGAPocc4.pdf [hereinafter The Rush to Regulate].
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 2 (noting
that, "'Scaling up' will require increasing the scope (number of individuals
reached), impact (effect on the well-being of borrowers), and depth (ability to
reach the poorest of the poor) of microfinance.").
51. Id. at 6 (citing, A. Granitsas & Deidre Sheehan, Grassroots Capitalism, Far E.
Econ. Rev. 39 (2001)).
52. The Microfinance Revolution, supra note 2, at 10.
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tom 50 percent of people living below the poverty line. That is, some 41.6
million of the poorest people in the world have been reached by MFIs. '53
While this seems to be a sizeable increase and is certainly a step in the
right direction, there are plenty of individuals who still lack access to fi-
nancial services. In fact, in 2003, the World Bank estimated that even in
Bangladesh, where the microfinance market is very well developed, only
18.4 percent of potential clients were reached. 54 This is commendable,
but Bangladesh is only a best-case scenario; microfinance services in
other parts of the world are reaching far fewer individuals. 55 In Brazil, it
is estimated that only 0.4 percent of the poor are being reached. 56 To put
this problem into perspective, some have estimated that the existing un-
met demand for financial services is in the neighborhood of 360 million
households, or 1.8 billion people, worldwide. 57 The question then be-
comes, if the idea of microfinance works, why are more people not being
reached?
The simple answer to that question is that modern-day MFIs do not
have access to enough funds to reach all of the individuals in need.58
Even in 1996, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) recog-
nized that reaching this unmet demand will require more funding than
donors and governments alone can provide.59 From their outset, many
MFIs were NGOs and relied, almost solely, on donors for the funds that
they would lend to potential borrowers at subsidized interest rates.60
Many times these organizations also received substantial assistance from
governments that provided them with lump-sum grants in order to assist
with their lending efforts. 61 Unfortunately, little has changed since the
outset of MFIs, and most are still operating under this system. Although
some MFIs may be operating in this manner because it is easier than to
try to change, part of the problem is also the current legal and regulatory
framework that does not allow NGOs to accept deposits or access funds
from other commercial sources. 62 The emerging consensus is clear:
"achieving an order of magnitude change in the scale of microfinance will
require deposit mobilization. ' 63 In fact, some even believe that continu-
ing to rely on these subsidized funds is detrimental to the MFIs. 64 So
long as these funds are available, MFIs will likely never reach self-sus-
53. Id. at 15.
54. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 6.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Aaron Jones, Note, Promotion of a Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in
Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187, 194 (2006) (citing THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF MICROFINANCE: BALANCING BUSINESS AND DEVELOP-
MENT 200 (Deborah Drake & Elisabeth Rhyne eds., 2002)).
58. Focus No. 4, supra note 3, at 1.
59. Id. at 1.
60. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 3.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
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tainability or reach as many clients as possible. 65 If we know that with
more money MFIs will reach more people, and we know that so long as
MFIs rely on donors and governments, those funds will never be ade-
quate, we must then ask, where will that money come from?
Perhaps the answer is easier to find than it first appears. In fact, many
MFIs have expressed interest in increasing "their outreach by raising
funds from commercial sources, including" taking deposits from the same
pool of customers that they provide with lending services.66 The problem
lies in the fact that many MFIs are currently organized in such a way that
they are not licensed to take these deposits, and current regulatory
frameworks, which do allow for the taking of deposits, do not cover these
types of entities.67 "Since these institutions do not have financial licenses,
they cannot leverage their resources by capturing deposits... [and] [t]he
requirements for a regular banking license are too high for the institu-
tions interested in poor clients."'68 Herein lies one of the strongest justifi-
cations for a formalized regulatory framework for MFIs. Without this
new regulation, MFIs are destined to occupy much the same position that
they do right now-providers of microcredit to a small portion of the
world's poor, but only with the help of donors and governments. 69 While
that position in and of itself is not a negative thing, a system in which
MFIs reached a much greater percentage of potential clients and in which
a greater number of MFIs were self-sufficient is much more desirable.
The necessity of regulation, then, is easily stated. Microfinance should
reach more people and should become more self-sufficient, but neither of
these is possible without greater access to funds.70 Access to more funds
is only possible when deposit taking is enabled and reliance on donors
and government grants ceases. 71 Deposit taking itself, then, necessitates
regulatory and supervisory oversight. Without more regulation and su-
pervision, it would not be prudent to allow MFIs to take deposits and
without taking deposits, MFIs will likely continue to rely on donor and
government funds. "Practitioners and academics alike agree that the fu-
ture for microfinance lies in developing a well-regulated microfinance en-
vironment that will allow the poor to access a wide variety of financial
services, effectively linking them to the developed sectors of the econ-
omy."'72 That being said, care should be taken not to implement a regula-
tory scheme before a particular region is ready to fully and effectively
implement it.
65. Id.
66. Focus No. 4, supra note 3, at 1.
67. The Rush to Regulate, supra note 47, at 12.
68. Id.
69. Focus No.4, supra note 3, at 1.
70. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 6.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 5-6.
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B. TIMING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
While the general consensus is that a more formalized regulatory
framework that provides for appropriate enabling legislation and proper
oversight will ultimately benefit the microfinance industry as a whole, not
all countries-and the MFIs operating within them-are currently ready
to undertake such a task.73 The challenges that face countries wishing to
maximize the productivity of their MFIs lie not only in deciding what
type and how much regulation is appropriate, but when the implementa-
tion of that framework is appropriate.74 While developing the perfect
framework may seem to be more in line with moving ahead in the
microfinance industry, if one does not take time to adequately consider
how that framework will be implemented and the possible hurdles that
supervisors and MFIs will face, the "planning of frameworks can lead us
into an alluring cloud-land of elegant structures that can't be imple-
mented. '75 Even "[t]he most carefully conceived regulations will be use-
less, or worse, if they can't be enforced by effective supervision. ' 76 As
some suggest, a country's current reluctance to place MFIs under more
formal regulation and supervision may have less to do with them turning
a blind eye to the needs of the poverty stricken within their borders than
it has to do with lack of current supervisory capabilities.77 In some coun-
tries, the mainstream commercial banking system may be so unstable,
and the oversight of that system so challenging, that a supervisor simply
lacks the time or resources to adequately perform any new regulatory
roles. 78
The first factor in determining a country's readiness, or necessity, for
financial regulatory reform is whether the current regulatory system
"inappropriately inhibits" the poor's access to financial services. 79 It is
important to remember that in this assessment, one should only be con-
cerned with "inappropriate" inhibition and that some regulations that
prohibit MFIs from taking certain actions are needed and reasonable. 80
An example of this type of prohibition would be not to hold NGOs "to
any sort of financial standards or oversight [in] taking deposits. '81 While
one of the main goals of new regulation may be to set up a framework in
which MFIs are able to take deposits, we should recognize that without
that proper oversight and supervision, which presumably is not in place,
the ability to accept deposits is unwarranted. 82 "Inappropriate" inhibi-




77. See Rush to Regulate, supra note 47, at 3.
78. See generally id.
79. USAID Programming Tool, supra note 5, at 16.
80. Id. at 15.
81. Id.
82. See id.
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tion could include regulations that severely limit an MFI's ability to ex-
tend credit.83 The question, "[Does] the current regulatory framework
inappropriately inhibit access to finance among the poor?" is perhaps one
of the most important questions in ascertaining whether a particular re-
gion is ready for regulatory reform.
By researching and analyzing the data necessary to answer this ques-
tion, one should be able to determine if a new regulatory framework is
likely to have any effect on the poor's access to financial services at all. If
the answer to this question is "yes," then it is likely that a new framework
is warranted because the current one presumably keeps "larger scale
commercial financial institutions from. . .providing financial services to
poor households" and keeps "small financial institutions (such as unregu-
lated NGOs) from growing larger, attracting greater and more diverse
sources of private capital, and providing a wider array of financial ser-
vices."'84 A "no" answer suggests that the lack of available financial ser-
vices to the poor is related to factors other than the regulatory
framework, such as a lack of capacity building or market demand. 85
While this question is important, several other factors must be taken into
consideration.
The second factor to consider is the existing workload of the financial
regulator and the capacity for this regulator to implement a new regula-
tory framework for microfinance institutions.8 6 The question one should
try to answer in regard to this issue is, "Does the financial regulator have
the potential capacity to undertake new responsibilities that would in-
crease access to finance?" 87 Unfortunately, financial regulators in many
countries are already stretched to their limits just trying to manage the
existing commercial banking system.88 Microfinance institutions do not
typically operate in the most stable regions of the globe, and the regula-
tors responsible for financial soundness in those regions may be faced
with an inadequate staff, a shortage of resources, and a "political
minefield" in which to accomplish their duties. 89 Essentially, answering
this question will determine if enacting a new regulatory framework
would ultimately have any effect on alleviating the problem of the poor's
limited access to financial services.
If this question may be answered with a "yes," then "[t]he regulator has
a strong grasp of its responsibilities in overseeing the existing financial
system and has the resources and technical capacity to undertake poten-
tial new responsibilities to overcome regulatory obstacles to access to fi-
83. Id.
84. USAID.gov, Model Scope of Work: Legal & Regulatory Reform for Access to Fi-
nance Policy & Programming Toolkit, May 2006, at 22, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-
docs/PNADI460.pdf [hereinafter USAID Programming Tool, May].
85. Id.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id.
88. The Rush to Regulate, supra note 47, at 2-3
89. Id. at 3.
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nance." 90 Unfortunately, many times this question will be answered with
a "no." This "no" suggests that the regulator is already being asked to
operate above its capacity and is currently unable to meet its responsibili-
ties. 91 In this case, "Any additional work would be overly burdensome,
and any regulatory development affecting access to finance could not be
carried out in a sufficient manner to achieve any level of success. Any
new regulation would likely have no impact on access to financial ser-
vices."' 92 While this article suggests that new regulation and increased
supervision is key in achieving far-reaching and self-sufficient
microfinance institutions, this regulation is simply not feasible if there are
no resources available to put the framework into action.
The third factor that USAID suggests should be considered is the exis-
tence of an influential public or private advocate for regulatory reform.93
This "champion," as USAID terms the advocate, could be either an indi-
vidual, or, preferably, a group of individuals, who understand the com-
plexities of microfinance regulatory reform and may help to initiate a
reform process, either with their political or moral authority. 94 While a
champion for reform is a good thing, those hoping for new regulation
should be sure not to choose a champion who fails to adequately grasp
the ins and outs of microfinance and may push for potentially damaging
reform, such as "interest rate caps or the prudential regulation of small
credit-only institutions. ' 95 Assessing this factor will allow proponents of
reform to decide whether now is the right time to push for new legisla-
tion, or if they should wait until there is a greater consensus of individuals
who believe reform is in the best interest of the microfinance industry.
Perhaps equally as important as assessing the existence of a champion is
determining if there is a "detractor," or an individual, or group of individ-
uals that opposes the reform of microfinance regulation. 96 It is almost
certain that proponents will have to overcome some opposition, but if
that opposing power has significant influence, politically or otherwise,
regulatory reform may not be immediately possible. 97
The fourth factor for consideration may be viewed from the perspec-
tive of the organization pushing for reform. The pursuance of any type of
regulatory reform will typically take the efforts of some outside organiza-
tion.98 Before that organization undertakes such a task, it should decide
whether it has the capacity to actually help in that situation. That organi-
zation must evaluate whether it has the available resources, an adequate
understanding of the microfinance problems facing a region, and suffi-
90. USAID Programming Tool, May, supra note 84, at 32.
91. USAID Programming Tool, Dec., supra note 5
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 21.
95. USAID Programming Tool, May, supra note 84, at 33.
96. USAID Programming Tool, supra note 5, at 22.
97. Id.
98. See, id. (discussing the ability of USAID, specifically, to undertake any regulatory
reform project and USAID's ability to effect change within a specific region.)
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cient positioning within the region to effect change. 99 Although some de-
velopment-based organizations, who don't have the knowledge or the
resources necessary to implement change, may want to assist MFIs in
achieving more favorable regulation within a specific region, it may be
best for that organization to step aside and let other more adequately
positioned groups take the lead.
To be sure, a more formalized regulatory framework and the increased
regulation of microfinance entities, have the ability to effect positive
change on the problem of access to financial services, but not all regions
and not all MFIs are currently ready to pursue that change. 100 While this
paper suggests that increasing regulation of microfinance entities may ul-
timately lead to MFIs having greater outreach to the world's impover-
ished citizens and to MFIs becoming more sustainable and self-sufficient
entities, it is important to realize that regulatory reform is not currently
appropriate for microfinance sectors in every region. Assuming that reg-
ulation is appropriate, in that the current regulatory framework is inhib-
iting access to financial services, and the supervisor, or newly created
supervisory organization will have the ability to effectively implement a
new regulatory scheme, the next question is "What specific type of regu-
lation is appropriate?"
IV. PRUDENTIAL AND NON-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
The main purposes of enhanced regulatory regimes for microfinance
institutions are clear: "to encourage the formation of new MFIs and/or
[to] improve performance of existing institutions," and to attain the ulti-
mate goal of "increasing the volume of financial services delivered and
the number of clients served."' 01
What appears to be less clear is what types of regulation will be needed
and to what extent each of those types should be utilized. In general,
there are two types of regulation, prudential and non-prudential. "Regu-
lation is 'prudential' when it is aimed specifically at protecting the finan-
cial system as a whole as well as protecting the safety of small deposits in
individual institutions." 10 2 Regulation for any other purposes may be
termed "non-prudential."' 01 3 Generally, prudential regulation is more
complex, more difficult to administer, and more expensive than non-pru-
dential regulation, which leads to the important principle of avoiding the
use of "burdensome prudential regulation for non prudential purposes-
that is, purposes other than protecting depositors' safety and the sound-
ness of the financial sector as a whole.' 0 4 In order to achieve the goals
of improved access to microfinance services and improved sustainability
99. Id.
100. See, generally, USAID Programming Tool, supra note 5, at 15-23; see also, Rush to
Regulate, supra note 47.
101. Consensus Guidelines, supra note 6, at 8.
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and self-sufficiency of MFIs, a combination of these two types of regula-
tion, as well as some enabling regulation, will be necessary.105 While this
is true, care must always be taken to ensure that the regulation enacted is
both feasible for the countries and the MFIs in terms of resources and
expenses and will result in the desired consequences within the
microfinance industry.
A. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
As mentioned previously, prudential regulation is used to avoid a
banking crisis, or a failure of the financial sector as a whole, and to pro-
tect depositors. 10 6 If supervisors do not limit their focus to these two is-
sues, "resources can be wasted, institutions can be saddled with
unnecessary compliance burdens, and development of the financial sector
can be constrained."1 0 7 Interestingly, "[e]ven where it has hundreds of
thousands of customers, microfinance today seldom accounts for a large
enough part of a country's financial assets to pose serious risk to the over-
all banking and payments system.' 10 8 While at some later date it is plau-
sible that systemic risk issues must be taken into consideration, prudential
regulation is not currently needed to address issues of this type. 10 9 This
being said, it is clear that some prudential regulation will be necessary in
order to facilitate deposit taking by MFIs. But, what is also clear is that
prudential regulation is neither needed nor warranted to address many of
the issues facing MFIs today.110 Many of those issues may be addressed
with non-prudential regulation and will be discussed in part B of this sec-
tion. Before discussing the possible benefits of prudential regulation, it is
important to note that creating new, less-burdensome regulation for
microfinance institutions does have the potential to cause undesirable
effects.
Some claim that prematurely opening a new "regulatory window," pre-
sumably one that does not have requirements that are as stringent as
those required of traditional banks, too soon, may result in a "prolifera-
tion of under-qualified depository institutions, and create a supervisory
responsibility that cannot be fulfilled."'1 1 Problems resulting from this
prematurely opened window included the licensing of a number of un-
sound rural banks and the expending of excessive supervisory resources
105. See Focus No. 4, supra note 3, at 1.
106. USAID, Microenterprise Development Brief Regulation and Prudential Supervi-
sion for Microfinance Programs-Making the Leap into Formal System 1 (1995)
[hereinafter Microenterprise Development Brief].
107. CONSENSUS GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 16.
108. Id. at 7
109. Id. at 7-8.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 8; see also, Patrick Meagher, Microfinance Regulation in Developing Coun-
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to rectify the situation. 112 While this danger should certainly be consid-
ered, this does not mean that regulation of some MFIs cannot prove to be
useful, in fact necessary, for the further development of microfinance's
outreach to potential clients.
Without a doubt, the prudential regulations imposed on MFIs will need
to look different than those typically imposed on regular banks. MFIs are
unique entities and face a number of challenges that typical banks do not,
such as high unit costs of lending and more rapid decapitalization due to
geographically concentrated portfolios and "contagious delinquency."' 13
Because microfinance providers have to face this different set of issues
and operate in a somewhat different manner than traditional banking,
these issues will need to be addressed.
1. Capital Adequacy
As mentioned previously, microfinance portfolios are almost always
concentrated in terms of geography, thus making these portfolios more
volatile, due to a lack of diversification, and prone to "contagious delin-
quency," due to the lack of collateral securing the loans. 114 Even though
many MFIs post excellent repayment rates, once delinquency begins and
repayment ends within a particular area, an MFI's portfolio can deterio-
rate very quickly. 115 Because microfinance borrowers are incentivized to
repay loans solely from their expectation of future access to credit, delin-
quency can spread like a disease. 116 When one borrower sees that other
borrowers are not repaying their loans, they lose their only incentive to
pay because the delinquency of others has made it less likely that the MFI
will be around in the future to loan to them.117 If a microcredit client
fully believes that the lending institution will fail before that client has the
opportunity to receive further loans, the client loses the incentive to re-
pay his or her current loan.
Due to this heightened risk of decapitalization, it seems that MFIs
should actually be subject to higher capital adequacy requirements than
are applied to normal banks. 118 Although some claim that this "will tend
lower the return on equity in microlending, thus reducing its attractive-
ness as a business," this is likely a hurdle that MFIs will have to over-
come-at least until the industry proves that it is capable of adequately
managing risks and that the supervisors are able to respond in an expedi-
tious manner to any problems. 119
112. Consensus Guidelines, supra note 6, at 8.
113. Meagher, supra note 111, at 3; Impact of Government Regulation on
Microfinance, supra note 44, at 13.
114. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 13.
115. Consensus Guidelines, supra note 6, at 21.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 13-14.
119. Consensus Guidelines, supra note 6, at 22.
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2. Relaxation of Unsecured Lending Limits and Loan Loss Provisions
While regulations significantly limiting unsecured lending in traditional
banks may be appropriate, these types of regulations, which would limit
unsecured lending to, for example, 100 percent of an institutions equity
base, are inappropriate for MFIs.120 Likewise, regulation "requiring
100% loan loss provisioning for all unsecured loans (at distribution vs.
when delinquent) are inappropriate for microfinance.' 121 This first type
of regulation would severely limit the ability of MFIs to operate success-
fully, because it would make it impossible for an MFI to "leverage its
equity with deposits or borrowed money. ' ' 122 If MFIs are to achieve sus-
tainability, it appears that they will definitely need the ability to leverage
their equity. As for the second type of regulation, while it may be inap-
propriate to require 100 percent provisioning up front (before delin-
quency occurs), once a loan becomes delinquent, the fact that the loan is
unsecured justifies more aggressive provisioning than would be required
of a traditional bank's collateralized portfolio. 123 Still other types of pru-
dential regulation will need revision before they are applied to MFIs.
3. Loan Documentation
While some sort of loan documentation is almost always necessary for
prudential regulation, "[g]iven the nature of microfinance loan sizes and
customers, it would be excessive or impossible to require them to gener-
ate the same loan documentation as commercial banks." 124 Where regu-
lation would require financial statements of borrowers' businesses or
evidence that those businesses are formally registered, the regulations
should be waived for micro-sized loans. 125 As is pointed out by Hubka
and Zaidi, there are a very limited number of microentrepreneurs that
even have formally registered businesses, not to mention formal financial
statements, as would be required to complete typical loan documenta-
tion.126 Instead, what may be appropriate for microloans is a simple as-
sessment of the borrower's cash flow. 127 This type of documentation
would be fairly simple to implement and would provide significant data
on a particular borrower's ability to repay his or her loan.' 28 Moreover,
by allowing MFIs to operate with less paperwork, the overall costs of
operating an MFI and the costs associated with each microloan are kept
at a minimum. This is extremely important to the ultimate success and
self-sustainability of the microfinance industry as a whole.
120. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 13; Consen-
sus Guidelines, supra note 6, at 22.
121. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 13.
122. Consensus Guidelines, supra note 6, at 22.
123. Id. at 23.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, supra note 44, at 13.
127. Consensus Guidelines, supra note 6, at 23.
128. Id.
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Although this is just a small selection of issues that will need to be
addressed, each of these issues will be important to the overall goal of
achieving the requisite prudential regulation necessary to make deposit-
taking possible, while working to keep the costs of prudential regulation
down. While it is important that this regulation do its job in insuring the
strength and soundness of the financial institutions being regulated, it is
equally important that the regulation not become so overbearing as to
limit the outreach of microfinance institutions. After all, the ultimate
goal of any regulatory framework to the microfinance industry is to in-
crease the number of clients served and the number of services offered by
MFIs, and thereby decrease poverty on a global scale.
B. NON-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
As has been noted, "[m]icrofinance as an industry can never reach its
full potential until it as able to move into the sphere of prudentially regu-
lated institutions, where it will have to be prudentially supervised." 129
However, that being said, there are a number of issues facing MFIs that
may be solved without prudential regulation, thus decreasing the overall
cost and increasing the flexibility within a regulatory framework. The
non-prudential regulatory issues span a wide spectrum and include "ena-
bling the formation and operation of microlending institutions; protecting
consumers; preventing fraud and financial crimes; setting up credit infor-
mation services," as well as a host of other issues. 130 A few of the more
important ones will be addressed below.
1. Permission to Lend
In a number of countries, activities that are not specifically prohibited
are "implicitly permissible."' 31 In these countries, the legal and regula-
tory framework will rarely prohibit an NGO-MFI from providing lending
services to that country's poor.132 Although this is true in some countries,
other countries disallow lending "unless there is an explicit legal authori-
zation" for such an activity to occur. 133 If this is the case, new non-pru-
dential regulation should be introduced providing for lending capabilities
for non-deposit-taking MFIs. 134 This regulation will usually be fairly sim-
ple and may not provide for much more "than a public registry and per-
mit-issuing process." 135 While this type of regulation does not enable
deposit taking. which this paper argues is key to the ultimate success of
MFIs, it is a stepping stone to that ultimate goal. In fact, it is completely
plausible that many MEIs will need to start with lending services and
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id.
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work their way into a fully operational and self-sustainable MFI with
both deposit-taking and lending capabilities.
2. Consumer Protection
The consumer protection issues may be divided into two sub issues,
namely "protecting borrowers against abusive lending and collection
practices, and providing borrowers with truth in lending-accurate, com-
parable, and transparent information about the cost of loans. ' 136 "There
is often a concern about protecting microcredit clients against lenders
who make loans without enough examination of the borrower's repay-
ment capacity." 137 While these issues certainly warrant regulation, many
times there is another body that may perform these functions other than
the prudential supervisory authority. 138 This will free up resources for
the prudential supervisory authority to address those problems that do
require prudential regulation while lowering the costs to the MFIs.
Moreover, the truth in lending requirements should not require pru-
dential regulation either. Perhaps one of the most important issues
within this "truth in lending" subset is the requirement of lenders to ex-
press their pricing as effective interest rates. 139 As discussed previously,
the administrative cost of servicing a portfolio is much higher if that port-
folio is composed of many tiny loans as opposed to a few larger loans. 140
Because of this, "microlending usually cannot be done sustainably unless
the borrowers pay interest rates that are substantially higher than the
rates banks charge to their traditional borrowers." 141 Many times, requir-
ing the lending institutions to disclose these rates as "effective rates" will
be met with public disapproval and political backlash even where these
rates make both moral and financial sense.1 42 This being the case, some
question whether it is appropriate to require microlenders to disclose this
information in this way, especially because microborrowers have repeat-
edly shown that they are willing to pay these higher rates necessary to
cover the costs of operating a portfolio filled with microloans.143 It is
clear that full disclosure should be made as to what is expected of each
client and the terms of each microloan, but every effort should be made
to avoid unwarranted disapproval by the public or politicians that may be
less than fully educated about the microfinance industry.
Although it is clear that prudential regulation will ultimately be neces-
sary in order for microfinance institutions to reach their full potential, a
number of issues facing MFIs do not require prudential regulation. By
dealing with these issues using non-prudential regulation, the costs of reg-
136. Id.
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ulation are kept down, and the flexibility within the framework is
maximized.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposal of this paper, then, is straightforward. Some prudential
regulation is necessary in order for microfinance to reach its full poten-
tial. As of now, MFIs lack the funds necessary to reach all the customers
demanding financial services and to become self-sufficient entities. The
easiest way to increase access to funds is to allow these institutions to
take deposits from the same customers to which they currently extend
credit. This deposit taking capability, however, should not be given with-
out some prudential oversight. It is important to understand that while
some prudential regulation is needed in order for MFIs to reach the ulti-
mate goals of increased access to financial services and increased self-
sustainability of MFIs, too much prudential regulation will lead to the
demise of MFIs. Prudential regulation is expensive and hard to imple-
ment; this being the case, those issues that may be dealt with without
prudential regulation should be.
The ultimate regulatory framework within which microfinance institu-
tions will operate should be a balanced one-one that balances the need
for oversight and supervision in order to protect customer's deposits with
the need to keep costs low and flexibility high for microfinance institu-
tions. MFIs are unlike traditional banks; the cost of doing business is
higher, and in many ways they face more substantial risks. Without
greater flexibility and lower costs, the ultimate goal of increasing the
amount of services provided to the world's poor may never be met.
While the regulatory frameworks adopted in each region will necessa-
rily differ to some degree in order to accommodate issues specific to a
region, the basic structure of the regulatory system might consist of a pru-
dential regulatory agency and a regulatory board comprised of members
of the microfinance industry. This paper suggests establishing a pruden-
tial regulatory agency in each region in which MFIs will operate. The
number of tasks with which this agency will be charged should be limited
in order to keep the resources used by this agency to a minimum and the
costs of running the agency low, both for the country in which the agency
is established and for the MFIs, which are regulated by this third-party
supervisor. As discussed previously, if this third-party supervisor does
not limit its focus to ensuring depositor safety and ensuring the soundness
of the MFI sector as a whole, then "resources can be wasted, institutions
can be saddled with unnecessary compliance burdens, and development
of the financial sector can be constrained."1 44 Because today the
microfinance sector of many economies is not large enough to pose a
significant risk to the banking system as a whole (even if a large number
of MFIs were to fail), the most important concern of this agency will be
144. Id. at 16.
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depositor protection. This prudential regulatory agency, should have the
ability to review an MFI's compliance with guidelines set by the regula-
tory board, and ultimately grant an institution deposit-taking status.
Without a "deposit-taking license" or some form of an affirmative grant
of deposit-taking status from this agency, MFIs would be limited solely to
microlending activities. The deposit-taking status of an MFI should be
reconsidered annually by reviewing the MFI's compliance with the guide-
lines and standards set by the regulatory board.
A regulatory board composed of managers and directors of the MFIs
themselves could then handle the non-prudential regulation of the
microfinance industry. This board could set guidelines and standards that
MFIs will need to meet on a yearly basis in order to maintain deposit
taking status. By allowing the industry to regulate itself and set its own
standards, the costs of regulation may be kept to a minimum. Moreover,
the standards set will be in line with what is reasonable and achievable
within the microfinance industry. Because the individuals setting the
standards work in the industry, they will better understand what is possi-
ble and needed in terms of regulation and standards that should be met.
This being said, care should be taken to ensure that regulations are firm
enough to have the desired response. With self-regulation, there is also
the potential for the guidelines to become too lackadaisical in performing
their function of ensuring sound MFIs. This problem can be curbed by
the oversight of a third-party regulatory agency. After all, it is this agency
that will ultimately determine if a particular MFI achieves deposit-taking
status.
It may even be possible to implement a "test period" for new MFIs
hoping to achieve deposit-taking status. In essence, these entities would
work to comply with the guidelines for some period of time, say three to
five years, before they would be eligible for licensing by the prudential
regulatory agency. After showing the non-prudential regulatory board
that it is capable of operating in a way that complies with the guidelines
for an extended period of time, then that MFI should become eligible to
be licensed. Of course, the opposite is also true. Any MFI that fails to
meet the standards set by the industry itself may have its deposit-taking
license removed. By splitting the duties of regulation and supervision be-
tween a small, focused, regulatory agency and a broader regulatory board
comprised of industry participants, costs may be kept to a minimum and
flexibility may be placed in the regulatory framework.
Before any step is taken toward a new regulatory framework, it is im-
portant to make sure that a particular geographic region is ready for that
new regulation. Reviewing the four factors recommended by USAID
may help in making this determination. These four factors include the
current status and characteristics of the regulatory framework within the
country, the capacity of a financial regulator to properly carry out the
supervisory role after implementation of a regulatory framework, the ex-
istence of some public advocate who may sway politicians and help to
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educate the public as to what the reform means, and the opportunity for
some outside organization to effect change within the region. 145 Only
when these factors suggest that a region is ready for new regulation
should such a project be undertaken. Moreover, it is important to note
that every region will require tailoring the specific regulatory framework
to its needs and the implementation process of that new framework will
look different in each area.
Even history provides some guidance on how the ultimate regulatory
framework should look. By allowing the mobilization of deposits through
enabling legislation and coupling that with appropriate regulation, the
Irish Loan Funds of the 19th century achieved self reliance and sus-
tainability not often found even in today's microfinance institutions.
146
In direct contrast to the Irish Loan Funds, the subsidized loan programs
utilized throughout Latin America rarely saw success. 147 The answer
seems to be clear then. Only if enabling legislation is allowed, supervi-
sion of the entities is increased, and MFIs are allowed to pursue their own
best interest in operations, will MFIs ultimately achieve their goal of self-
sustainability and their goal of increasing access to financial services for
the poor.
145. USAID Programming Tool, supra note 5, at 15.
146. See Does History Matter?, supra note 27, at 2.
147. Globalenvision, supra note 4.
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